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INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers don’t like numbers—as I often joke with my students, that’s 
why they choose to go to law school.  Kidding aside, however, the relative 
discomfort with numbers among lawyers individually adds up professional-
ly to a slim empirical base on which to assess how well American lawyers 
are doing what they promise the public they will do: deliver legal services 
with competence and in the public interest.  Even for the well-heeled 
client—the corporation that enjoys the services of our largest and most so-
phisticated firms, the ones to which the best and the brightest from our law 
schools flock—hard numbers on what legal services cost and what fraction 
of that cost is for real value are few and far between.  For example, we 
have little systematic data on legal costs, and essentially none showing the 
relationship between expenditures and results. 
Assessing the legal landscape for the ordinary citizen who has sporadic 
contact with the legal profession is a game played mostly in the dark.  What 
little data there is tends to be focused on the corporate legal services market 
which has money to spend on such information: hourly rates for the largest 
 
∗ University of Southern California (Kirtland Professor of Law and Professor of Econom-
ics).  I am grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts from Steve Burbank, Sam Es-
treicher, Ted Eisenberg, Marc Galanter, Bob Kagan, Bert Kritzer, Jody Kraus, and partici-
pants in the IJA Research on Access to Civil Justice at New York University Law School, 
the ABA Section on Litigation Symposium on Access to Legal Representation in Civil Liti-
gation, and workshops at the University of Virginia School of Law and the American Law 
and Economics Association Annual Meeting. 
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corporate law firms, for example, are now surveyed annually and published 
in the American Lawyer Magazine and National Law Journal.  The Ameri-
can Intellectual Property Lawyers Association publishes data on the total 
cost of I.P. litigation.  Proprietary studies by legal consultants such as Alt-
man-Weil (recently absorbed by American Lawyer Media) and Hildebrandt 
International provide data that law firm managers and general counsel can 
use to assess their own management practices, billing rates and profitabili-
ty.  Even when these studies purport to investigate the cost of legal services 
for non-corporate clients—individuals in need of family law or employ-
ment representation for example—the data quality is significantly inferior.  
For example, the Altman-Weil survey for 2005 reports average hourly rates 
for partners in General Business based on responses from 567 lawyers; for 
Family partners the average is based on responses from 34 lawyers.1  La-
bor-Management partner averages are based on 224 respondents; Labor-
Union on 25.2  That implies the margin of error on the averages reported 
for family lawyers or union-side labor lawyers is much bigger than that re-
ported for lawyers providing general business advice or advising manage-
ment. 
Systematic efforts to assess how well the legal markets and institutions 
that American lawyers (together with the judiciary) claim they have exclu-
sive authority to structure, serve, and regulate are few and far between.  In 
1994, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) released a study of the ex-
tent to which poor and moderate-income households experienced a legal 
need—defined as a problem that could be addressed by the legal system—
and how often those with a legal need sought the assistance of a private 
practitioner or legal aid lawyer.3  A proposal to update this study in 2005 
was rejected as unnecessary and too expensive.4  As a substitute, the Legal 
Services Corporation (“LSC”) reviewed nine state studies of legal needs of 
the poor, documented the extent to which LSC-funded providers had to 
turn away requests for assistance, and calculated the number of legal aid 
attorneys in the country.5  Also in 2005, the ABA published a study on pro 
bono work, which concluded that American lawyers on average provide 
 
 1. ALTMAN-WEIL INC., THE SURVEY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS 114 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 115. 
 3. AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS, MAJOR 
FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY *8 (1994), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.pdf. 
 4. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT 
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 3 (2007), available at http://www. 
lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf.  The first edition of this study was published in 2005, but citations 
in this article refer to the 2007 edition, which is “virtually the same.”  Id. at preface. 
 5. See id. at 3. 
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thirty-nine hours a year of pro bono services to the poor.6  That is a little 
over 2% of all legal effort. 
Not only are there few studies of the performance of the legal system for 
non-corporate clients (the distinction Marc Galanter draws between “natu-
ral” and “artificial” persons7), those that exist are almost uniformly focused 
on the delivery of legal services to the poor as a form of charity or welfare 
assistance.  While obviously of high significance, assessing only this seg-
ment of legal markets is a bit like assessing the performance of the U.S. 
health care system by asking only how well Medicaid and free clinics 
work.  It treats the issues of access and cost for citizens as if they were en-
tirely questions of the appropriate levels of charity (pro bono) and welfare 
spending.  But the vitality of a market democracy premised on the rule of 
law depends on more than minimal provision for those in desperate need at 
poverty levels of income.  And it depends on more than the quality and cost 
of services available to corporate and other large entities.8  It depends on 
the success with which law manages to serve in fact—not merely on the 
books—as the fundamental organizing principle of the institutions and rela-
tionships of the ordinary citizen.  Is law routinely available, for example, to 
consult before deciding how to choose between market options, or to eva-
luate how one has been treated in a relationship governed by legal prin-
ciples?  Or is law merely alive in moments of crisis?  We know that even in 
those moments of crisis—the impending loss of a relationship with one’s 
child, the loss of one’s home to foreclosure, bankruptcy in the face of im-
possible medical bills, or grievous injury in an accident—our legal system 
is not committed (as it is somewhat half-heartedly committed in the case of 
a felony charge) to ensuring that an individual is fully able to participate in 
the systems that will manage this crisis.  But what of the everyday life that 
falls short of crisis, that sets the path on which a crisis may occur or may be 
averted?  We live in an everyday world that is, in fact, flooded with law—
how our children are supposed to be treated in school, what lenders are 
supposed to tell us when they sell us a mortgage, when our employers can 
 
 6. AM. BAR ASS’N, SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMER-
ICA’S LAWYERS 4 (2005).  This is the average for “tier 1” services to poor individuals or or-
ganizations serving the poor.  It does not include “tier 2” services, which the ABA defined 
as services to other charitable or non-profit organizations, including “participation in activi-
ties for improving the legal system or the legal profession through groups such as bar asso-
ciations.”  Id. at 9. 
 7. See generally Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and 
its Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369 (2006). 
 8. I have recently looked at the problems faced in this corporate sector.  See Gillian K. 
Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Con-
trol of Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008). 
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and cannot change our conditions of work or pay, what is fair play in con-
sumer markets, and so on.  Every time we sign a document, click a box that 
says “I Agree,” enter a retail shop, or get on a local bus we navigate a 
world that is defined by legal obligations and rights and, importantly, one 
that assumes that the ordinary citizen who moves in this world is doing so 
as a functioning, choosing, legal agent.  Should that citizen end up in a cri-
sis that requires more active use or response to the legal system—filing or 
responding to a lawsuit or enforcement action—she will inevitably be 
treated as if she functioned with this kind of legal agency on the path that 
brought her to this point: bound by the contracts she “agreed” to or the 
risks she was given “notice” of or the legal consequences of the actions she 
took in caring for her children. 
We know that in the corporate client world, this is how the relationship 
with the legal system operates.  Most corporate work is before-the-fact, 
everyday advice on what contracts to sign, which regulations apply, how 
conduct is likely to be interpreted by enforcement authorities or, in the 
event of litigation, what the options are for modifying the extent of legal 
liability, how to manage a dispute before it becomes a lawsuit, and so on.  
But for ordinary citizens in the U.S. there is almost no functioning legal 
system in this ex ante sphere.  This has implications not only for the proba-
bility of a crisis down the road that the legal system will have to address—
with or without legal services made available to the individual in crisis—
but, fundamentally, for the extent to which it is realistic to look at our ela-
borate legal and regulatory structures as effective organizing principles for 
everyday relationships.  That can have implications far beyond the conse-
quences for a single individual, reaching into the efficacy of our legal sys-
tems and the rule of law as a whole. 
Consider the recent economic crisis.  Among the many interacting fac-
tors that led to the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage markets—and the 
banking system that was heavily invested in securities collateralized by 
sub-prime mortgages—were the sub-prime mortgage agreements entered 
into by millions of ordinary Americans.  In 2006, Lauren Wills presciently 
documented the complexity of these mortgages, particularly refinancing 
agreements and the utter failure of these markets to do what competitive 
markets are supposed to do, namely to match buyers’ demands with sellers’ 
offers.9  As she noted, it is almost impossible to determine the true cost of 
these complex contracts and equally difficult for an ordinary homeowner 
with sub-prime credit to either evaluate what they are taking on or to com-
 
 9. Lauren E. Wills, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Pre-
datory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707 (2006). 
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pare across competitive providers.  As a result, markets failed: people took 
on risk and obligations they could not afford and competition was ineffec-
tive in weeding out excessive or even abusive contract terms.10  This is 
market failure on a massive scale with enormous consequences for the en-
tire economy, and is traceable to legal failure.  That failure arose from re-
liance on complex legal rules which purportedly govern the relationship be-
tween lender and borrower on paper, but which in fact are largely 
ineffective on the ground, because of the complete absence in the individu-
al consumer market of the kind of upfront contract review and advice that 
is routinely obtained in legal markets for corporate clients.  Systemic fail-
ure of our ex ante legal advice markets for ordinary citizens has now preci-
pitated millions of crises for individual homeowners and borrowers, with 
huge demands for back-end legal assistance in renegotiation of mortgages 
and management of foreclosure and bankruptcy processes.  We can expect 
that few of those individual crises for ordinary people will be managed 
with legal assistance.  As a result, the foundation on which our complex fi-
nancial institutions and systems are built—globally—may well rest on a 
fundamentally lawless and unpredictable footing. 
But concretely, we can say little about just how lawless this footing 
might be.  Empirically, we lack any real data on the quantity or quality of 
legal services available to ordinary individuals, although casually most of 
us in the profession know that the bulk of civil legal services, and especial-
ly ex ante advisory services, are ultimately provided to corporations rather 
than ordinary folks.  Indeed, we could say that the utter lack of attention to 
the size and vitality of the legal markets serving ordinary individuals in the 
conduct of their everyday lives in a law-thick world is itself testament to 
how the profession has defined these markets out of existence.  We can 
look—and in what follows I will try to give some sense of what we will 
find—but for the most part there is nothing there. 
To give some sense of just what is missing, after reviewing the few ex-
isting—and well-worn—legal needs studies, I provide some tidbits of data 
that might shed some light on the size of the U.S. legal markets serving 
non-corporate clients.  I draw in particular on some comparative data to put 
these tidbits into perspective.  The methodology here is not to look at indi-
viduals and count up, but rather to look for the macro indicators of the ex-
tent to which resources across the economy as a whole are devoted to pro-
viding legal inputs to ordinary citizens for civil matters.  In doing so, I hope 
 
 10. Id. at 806-07.  Wills notes that in the prime mortgage market, there is much greater 
uniformity across mortgage offers so that borrowers can much more easily compare terms 
and are unlikely to be hit with hidden components such as pre-payment penalties, high clos-
ing costs, and other fees as lenders compete for their business. 
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to broaden the focus beyond the existing studies which focus largely on the 
poor in particular moments of legal crisis and dispute.  The goal is to try to 
get a handle on the health of the legal markets serving ordinary citizens as a 
whole.  The paucity and unreliability of the data, however, make this an 
exercise in questions, not answers.  What we will see is that the U.S., de-
spite being one of the most law-based socio-economic systems on the pla-
net, arguably devotes significantly less support than most other countries—
both developed and developing—to the legal markets and institutions ne-
cessary to make all this law the organizing principle in fact, not just theory, 
of everyday relationships.  This should be a major topic of careful data col-
lection and analysis. 
I.  THE MICRO VIEW: COMPARATIVE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS SURVEYS 
In 1993, the ABA conducted a study, published in 1994, assessing the 
legal needs of the poor (defined as those living at or below 125% of the po-
verty line), and of those with moderate income (those with incomes falling 
in the middle 60% of the income distribution).11  The study defined “legal 
needs” as problems or disputes that households had encountered, such as 
sub-standard housing, job loss, or divorce, and that could be addressed 
through the civil legal system.  With few exceptions (review of documents 
for a real estate transaction, for example) the focus of the study was on ex 
post dispute resolution and the nature of the legal assistance that might be 
offered. 
The study found that approximately 50% of households (47% of poor 
households and 52% of moderate-income households) were experiencing 
one or more legal needs at the time of the survey.12  Of those with legal 
needs, 37% of the poor sought assistance from a third-party for resolution 
of the problem, 29% from a specifically legal third party such as a lawyer 
(21%) or other from a non-legal third party (8%).13  Among moderate-
income households, assistance from a third-party was sought with 51% of 
problems, 39% from a specifically legal source (lawyers 28%, other le-
gal/judicial 12%).14 
It is difficult to interpret the significance of this legal needs survey in a 
vacuum in terms of what it tells us about the vitality of the legal environ-
ment in which ordinary Americans live and the extent to which law is a 
 
 11. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at *7.  In 1993, the top household income in this 
group was $60,000, approximately $88,000 in 2007 dollars. Id. 
 12. Id. at *9. 
 13. Id. at *17. 
 14. Id. at *18. 
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real, rather than illusory, structural principle in their everyday lives.  A 
comparison with similar studies in other countries, however, may tell us 
more. 
Similarly comprehensive (and in many ways, more comprehensive) sur-
veys of legal needs were conducted by Hazel Genn in England in 199615 
and by Genn and Alan Paterson in Scotland in 1997.16  Like the ABA 
study, the Genn and Paterson studies surveyed individuals about their expe-
rience with problems that could, in theory, be addressed through the civil 
legal system.  These studies did not filter respondents based on household 
income and so I will compare the results to the weighted average of low-
income and moderate-income results from the ABA.17 
The results for England and Wales show a level of what Genn and Pater-
son call “justiciable problems” comparable to the ABA study,18 with 40% 
of respondents experiencing at least one problem in the last five years.19  
The Scottish study shows a significantly lower incidence of 26%.20  But the 
results for both U.K. studies show that a significantly higher percentage of 
those with these problems resolve them with third-party help than in the 
U.S.: 60% in England and Wales21 and 65% in Scotland22 versus 48% in 
the U.S.  Strikingly, Genn reports that 93% of households in England and 
Wales reported having received third-party advice on a problem at some 
point in the past, 68% having received specifically legal advice at some 
 
 15. HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO 
LAW (1999). 
 16. HAZEL GENN & ALAN PATERSON, PATHS TO JUSTICE SCOTLAND: WHAT PEOPLE IN 
SCOTLAND DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW (2001). 
 17. Together, the ABA surveys drew samples from 80% of the U.S. household income 
distribution.  I have therefore weighted poor households (the lowest 20%) at 25% of the to-
tal, and moderate income at 75%. 
 18. Genn’s and Paterson’s studies had a more restrictive list of potential problems than 
the ABA study: the ABA included small business concerns and problems with the level of 
public services such as garbage collection, for example, which were not included in the U.K. 
studies. Compare GENN & PATERSON, supra note 16, at 32-33, with AM. BAR ASS’N, supra 
note 3, at *31-33.  The U.K. studies were at the individual, not household, level—leading to 
a smaller reported percentage in that a respondent could not report the problems others in 
their household had experienced.  But the U.K. studies also could lead to higher reports, in 
that respondents were asked about the past five years, whereas U.S. respondents were asked 
about problems in existence at the time of the survey and in the past year. 
 19. GENN, supra note 15, at 23.  See also PASCOE PLEASENCE, CAUSES OF ACTION: CIVIL 
LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 9 (2004) (36% and 33% of respondents to, respectively, 2001 and 
2004 U.K. surveys had experienced justiciable problems in the previous three-and-a-half 
years). 
 20. GENN & PATERSON, supra note 16, at 34. 
 21. GENN, supra note 15, at 68. 
 22. GENN & PATERSON, supra note 16, at 86. 
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point in the past.23  Interestingly, the specific use of lawyers in the U.K. 
surveys is roughly the same as in the U.S.: 27% in England and Wales,24 
29% in Scotland25 versus 26% in the U.S.26  Where the substantial differ-
ence emerges is in the use of other third-parties.  Moreover, because non-
lawyers in the U.K. are authorized to give legal advice (such as volunteer-
staffed Citizens Advice Bureaux or proprietary legal advice centers),27  the 
effective difference is even greater: Americans received advice from those 
who are able to give legal advice in only 37% of cases, compared to 60-
65% of U.K. cases.28  Furthermore, a far smaller percentage of the U.K. 
respondents, as compared to U.S. respondents, “lumped” their problem by 
doing nothing at all: fewer than 5%29 versus 29%.30  This suggests a very 
different legal environment for the ordinary citizen in the U.K. than in the 
U.S. 
As a further comparison, consider a legal needs survey that I helped de-
sign for the government of the Slovak Republic, a country transitioning to 
market democracy from communist government.  Slovakia joined the Eu-
ropean Union in 2004 and adopted the Euro in 2009.  The study was con-
ducted in 2004.  Slovak respondents reported a level of legal need compa-
rable to the U.S. and England, with 45% of households saying they had 
experienced at least one serious problem in the past two years.31  For those 
experiencing a legal need, 30% contacted a lawyer,32 another 13% had con-
 
 23. Id. 
 24. GENN, supra note 15, at 83. 
 25. GENN & PATERSON, supra note 16, at 102. 
 26. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at *18 (statistics weighted as described, supra note 
17). 
 27. The U.K. has no unauthorized practice restrictions on the provision of legal advice.  
See GENN, supra note 15, at 82. 
 28. Compare AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at *17, with GENN, supra note 15, at 68, and 
GENN & PATERSON, supra note 16, at 86. 
 29. This 5% figure excludes those who said they took no action because the problem 
was trivial; including these respondents generates a “no action” rate of 16% for England and 
Wales. Id. at 45.  A more recent survey in the U.K. indicates that the comparable “no ac-
tion” rate in 2004 was 10%, suggesting a decline. PASCOE PLEASENCE, CAUSES OF ACTION: 
CIVIL LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 81 (2d ed. 2006). 
 30. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at *18 (statistics weighted as described, supra note 
17). 
 31. The list of potential problems in the Slovak study largely tracked the U.K. studies, 
with the addition of problems with small business. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECO-
NOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS, SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
112 (2005) [hereinafter OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS]. 
 32. In Slovakia, as in many civil law countries, the category of “lawyer” also includes 
notaries and bailiffs, who hold law degrees, and are authorized to execute judgments; in 
most U.S. states, this function is performed by a sheriff or other public officer. See id. at 
107.  If we exclude notaries and bailiffs, who perform quasi-public functions more akin to a 
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tact with a legal actor (such as with a judge or court personnel) other than a 
lawyer, and a further 1% represented themselves in court without reporting 
any other contact with a legal professional.  (A total of 21% represented 
themselves in court; almost all of these also reported contact with at least 
one legal actor such as a lawyer, judge or court personnel.)  Slovak citi-
zens, in a country with GDP per capita of less than $8,000 in 200433 (GDP 
in the U.S. that year was approximately $41,00034),  thus had higher rates 
of contact with a lawyer and substantially higher rates of contact with the 
legal system as a whole than poor citizens in the U.S. and somewhat higher 
than middle income Americans.  Also striking is the fact that Slovak citi-
zens appear substantially less likely to “lump” their situation than either 
poor or middle income Americans: only 18% of Slovaks took no steps to 
resolve their problem. 
Legal needs studies have also recently been reported in Japan, the Neth-
erlands, Canada, and New Zealand.35  The Canadian study from 2006, sur-
veying low and moderate-income households, found that 47.7% of the 
population reported one or more legal needs in a three-year period36; there 
is no report of how those with needs dealt with the problem, only that 
33.9% of problems remained unresolved within the study period.37  The 
New Zealand study from 2006 found that 29% of respondents faced at least 
one problem in the past year38 and reported that during that year, 44% had 
sought or would seek third-party help.39  Because of the focus only on the 
past year and the inclusion of ongoing problems, the study does not allow 
us to determine what steps, if any, respondents ultimately took to resolve 
 
judge, the percentage who contacted a “lawyer” is 22%.  This and other uncited Slovak sta-
tistics come from a study I completed for the World Bank.  This is the first reporting of such 
statistics. 
 33. OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS, supra note 31, at 20. 
 34. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, COMPARATIVE REAL GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA AND PER EMPLOYED PERSON: 16 COUNTRIES, 1960-2007 
(2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/fls/flsgdp.pdf. 
 35. See Herbert Kritzer, Empirical Legal Studies Before 1940: A Bibliographic Essay, 
6(4) J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 925.  I am grateful to Ted Eisenberg for drawing this paper 
to my attention on seeing an earlier draft of my paper. 
 36. Ab Currie, A National Survey of the Civil Justice Problems of Low and Moderate 
Income Canadians: Incidence and Patterns 5 (April 2005) (unpublished manuscript, availa-
ble at http://cfcj-fcjc.org/docs/2006/currie-en.pdf). 
 37. Id. at 11. 
 38. New Zealand Legal Services Agency, Report on the 2006 National Survey of Unmet 
Legal Needs and Access to Services 15 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.lsa.govt.nz/documents/2006NationalSurveyofUnmetLegalNeedsandAccesstoSer
vices_002.pdf). 
 39. Id. at 35. 
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their problems.  The 2004 study in the Netherlands40 (which tracks the U.K. 
methodology) and the 2007 study in Japan41 (which also has a comparable 
methodology to the U.K. study) provide a basis for some comparison with 
the U.S., U.K., and Slovak studies and are included in Table 1.  The Dutch 
study reports that 67% of the population experienced one or more problems 
in the past five years,42 10% did nothing, and 44% relied on third party as-
sistance.43  Note that in the Netherlands, as in the U.K., non-lawyers may 
provide legal aid and assistance.44  The Japanese reports a low 19% rate of 
problems.45  Of those with problems, 25% apparently did nothing (the data 
reports what percentage had contact of any kind with the other side),46 and 
that 61% contacted a third party for assistance.47  Only 4% turned to a law-
yer.48  Thirteen percent turned to a legal provider or institution other than a 
lawyer.49 
 
 40. See generally Ben C.J. van Velthoven & Marijke ter Voert, Paths to Justice in the 
Netherlands (2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/ 
RM%202004.04.pdf). 
 41. Masayuki  Murayama, Experiences of Problems and Disputing Behaviour in Japan, 
14 MEIJI L.J. 1, 3 (2007). 
 42. Van Velthoven & ter Voert, supra note 40, at 4.  The Dutch study was conducted 
over the internet, rather than by face-to-face interviews and this may account for the higher 
reported prevalence of problems. Id. at 1. 
 43. Id. at 7. 
 44. In Table 1 infra, I have counted solicitors, civil notaries, bailiffs (who assist in col-
lecting judgments and are legal officers), legal aid centres, legal consultants, legal insurance, 
and law shops as “lawyers.” 
 45. Murayama, supra note 41, at 6.  The Japanese study indicates that respondents were 
recruited with a letter explaining that the study was focused on “legal problems” and this 
may explain the lower reported rate of problems. Id. at 2.  Most legal needs surveys do not 
ask respondents about “legal” problems in case this leads respondents to apply their own 
understanding of what is “legal” or not in filtering their responses. 
 46. Id. at 13. 
 47. Id. at 16. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  This includes:  police, legal consultation bureau at city hall, legal professional 
other than a lawyer, and consultation bureaus at a court, bar association, or legal aid associa-
tion.  These individuals may have also contacted a lawyer. 
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Table 1. Actions Taken by Those Reporting Legal Problem 
Country 
No 
Steps 
Taken 
Sought 
Third 
Party  
Assistance
Contact with 
Lawyer/  
Legal  
Professional
Contact with 
Other Legal 
Advisor/ 
Institution 
Contacted 
Other 
Third  
Party 
U.S. Poor† 38% 38% 21% 8% 9% 
U.S. Middle 
Income† 26% 51% 28% 12% 11% 
England & 
Wales* 5% 60% 27% 33% 
Japan** 25% 61% 15% 21% 34%  
Scotland* 3% 65% 29% 36% 
Slovakia*** 18% [44%] 30% 14% No data 
Netherlands** 10% 44% 14% 5% 25% 
† Based on most formal action taken. Source:  See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 3. 
* “No steps” based on main sample which excluded those in screening survey who indicated 
that taking no action was due to triviality of problem (16% (England & Wales) and 7% 
(Scotland) in screening survey took “no action”). Lawyer/legal professional includes solici-
tor, other legal professionals negligible.  Other calculated as residual and includes those 
(17% England, 14% Scotland) who, possibly in addition to contacting a solicitor, sought 
advice from a citizen advice bureau calculated. Source: see GENN, supra note 15, at 85, and 
GENN & PATERSON, supra note 16, at 104. 
** Lawyer or legal professional includes lawyer, consultation bureau at city hall, a bar asso-
ciation, court or legal aid center and legal professionals other than lawyers (Japan) and legal 
aid centre, law shop, legal consultant, legal insurer, bailiff, solicitor and notary (Nether-
lands).  Data on types of advice in original source are reported as percentages of instances of 
advice.  Data in table apply percentages of contacts to percentage of those who seek advice 
to estimate percentage of those with problems who sought particular types of assistance. 
Statistic for lawyer/legal professional contact in table includes multiple responses and thus 
overstates percentage of those seeking advice in category as a whole.  Statistic for other le-
gal advisor/institution includes contact with court, police, ombudsman, and includes those 
who may also have sought advice from legal professional.  Contact with “other third party” 
calculated as a residual.  Sources: see Murayama, supra note 40, at 16-17 (Japan), and van 
Velthoven and ter Voert, supra note 41, at 12 (Netherlands). 
*** Statistic for third party assistance is minimum, given lack of data about non-legal third 
party contacts.  Source: unpublished data on file with author. 
 
 
These studies suggest that the U.S. legal system plays a significantly 
smaller role in providing a key component of what law provides—ordered 
means of resolving problems and disputes—than either comparable ad-
vanced market democracies or countries still in the early stages of estab-
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lishing the basic institutions of democratic governance and a market econ-
omy.  This is not due to a lower incidence of situations in which there 
might be demand for what law provides.  With the exception of Japan, the 
levels of potential legal need are all comparable at about 50% of the popu-
lation at any given time. 
There is no reason to think that the situation today is any better in the 
U.S.  Although the ABA opted not to update the 1994 Legal Needs studies, 
the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) in 2005 published a study drawing 
on nine state surveys, assessing the incidence of legal needs among the 
poor and the experience in LSC-funded programs with unmet demand for 
legal aid and the number of legal aid lawyers.50  If anything, these studies 
suggest the situation is worse.  LSC-funded programs reported that, as a re-
sult of resource limitations, they were only able to serve half of the poor 
who sought assistance.51  The number of legal aid attorneys providing civil 
legal services was calculated to be 6,581, a little over one-half of one per-
cent of all U.S. lawyers.52 
Table 2 summarizes the findings of twelve state legal needs surveys.  All 
the surveys, other than Arizona and New Jersey, report legal needs expe-
rienced by households.  The surveys differ substantially in how they report 
the use of legal services: some report only the use of lawyers, some report 
actions taken as a percentage of households, and others as a percentage of 
problems.  Not all the surveys report whether a respondent took no action 
whatsoever.  The list of “problems” provided to respondents was relatively 
consistent across states with the exception that Massachusetts included mu-
nicipal and language problems that are arguably not susceptible to assis-
tance by a lawyer; these are excluded from “incidence” shown in Table 2. 
These state studies, including three more recent studies that were not in-
cluded in the 2005 LSC review,53 show an incidence of legal problems that 
is generally higher than that shown in the ABA study.54  Those reporting 
data on this difference suggest even higher rates at which poor people in 
America “lump” their problems, doing nothing to resolve difficulties that 
include relatively severe problems with family disputes, debt, housing, and 
employment.  And they paint the same story about how much less frequent-
 
 50. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 4. 
 51. Id. at 8. 
 52. Id. at 16. 
 53. ARIZ. FOUND. FOR LEGAL SERVS. & EDUC., VOICING A NEED FOR JUSTICE (2007); 
UTAH LEGAL SERVS., THE JUSTICE GAP: THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME UTAHNS 
(2006); ACCESS TO JUSTICE STUDY COMM., STATE BAR OF WIS., BRIDGING THE JUSTICE GAP: 
WISCONSIN’S UNMET LEGAL NEEDS (2007). 
 54. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 4, at 16. 
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ly Americans compared to citizens in other countries are able to draw on 
the law through contact with a lawyer or legal institution to help resolve 
their problems.  With the exception of Tennessee, the state studies suggest 
that among the poor the use of lawyers or others able to provide legal assis-
tance is even rarer than the 29% that the ABA 1994 study suggested,55 with 
almost half of the studies showing legal assistance rates in the 9-12% 
range.  This is well below the near 30% use of lawyers found in the English 
and Slovak studies, and the much higher percentage (perhaps as high as 
60% in both the U.K. and Slovakia) who contact either a lawyer or some 
other person or entity who is authorized to provide legal assistance. 
 
 55. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at *17-18. 
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Table 2. State Legal Needs Surveys 
State Year 
Incidence of 
Legal Needs 
(% of House-
holds Unless 
Noted) 
Average 
Number 
of Legal 
Needs 
No Steps  
Taken to 
Resolve 
Problem 
(% of Prob-
lems Unless 
Noted) 
Contact with 
Lawyer or Le-
gal Institution 
(% of Problems 
Unless Noted) 
Arizona 2007 
32% 
(individuals) — 
21% 
(households) 
12.5% 
(households) 
Connecticut 2003 65% 2.7 53% 10% 
Illinois 2005 49% 1.7 — 16.4% 
Massachu-
setts 2003 58% 2.02 45% 
[<14%*] 
(households) 
Montana 2005 — 3.5 — 16.4% 
New 
Jersey 2002 
33% 
(individuals) 1.8** 41% 11% 
Oregon 2000 45% 2.1 — 17.8% 
Tennessee 2004 70% 3.3 24.5% 
24%  
(lawyers) 
15%  
(legal aid)*** 
Utah 2006 67.5% 1.3 — 
12.3%  
(lawyers) 
(households) 
Vermont 2001 50% (est.) 1.1 30% 9% 
Washington 2003 87% 1.1 — 12% (lawyers) 
Wisconsin 2007 45% 2.1 — 
12% (house-
holds, help all 
problems) 
27% (house-
holds, help on a 
problem) 
* Combines percent contacting each of a list of different legal providers, not corrected for 
those who contacted more than one. 
** New legal needs in given year; does not include those pending from prior years; per indi-
vidual. 
*** Percent contacting each type of provider, not corrected for those who contacted both. 
Sources: State Legal Needs Studies, available at http://www.nlada.org/Civil/Civil_SPAN/ 
SPAN_Library/document_list?topics=000055&list_title=State+Legal+Needs+Studies%3A+
Reports&start=1. 
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II.  THE MACRO VIEW: COMPARATIVE LEGAL RESOURCES 
The legal needs surveys give us a close-to-the-ground look at the legal 
problems encountered by ordinary Americans, albeit with a heavy focus on 
poor Americans.  As we have seen, these surveys suggest that “law” plays a 
very small role in the everyday handling of potentially justiciable problems 
in the U.S., and apparently significantly less than it does in a comparable 
advanced market democracy such as the U.K. or even in a developing mar-
ket democracy such as Slovakia.  Put differently, and echoing a recent re-
port by the U.N. Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, the 
vast majority of the legal problems faced by (particularly poor) Americans 
fall outside of the “rule of law,”56 with high proportions of people—many 
more than in the U.K., for example—simply accepting a result determined 
not by law but by the play of markets, power, organizations, wealth, poli-
tics, and other dynamics in our complex society. 
As we know, however, the normative power of the existing focus on the 
legal needs of the poor is largely constrained to a humanitarian concern of 
wealth redistribution and fairness towards the most disadvantaged.  But is 
there a deeper threat to the structure of a democratic society—especially 
one that purports to organize its relationships on the basis of law and legali-
ty—suggested by the finding that Americans are far more likely than those 
in the U.K. and Slovakia to “do nothing” in response to the legally cogniz-
able difficulties they face?  That they are far less likely to seek out others in 
their community capable of helping them to align their experiences with 
those contemplated by the laws and procedures that stack up in the volu-
minous legal materials of regulation, case law, statutes, and constitutions?  
Is there a paradox lurking here that in the system of adversarial legalism 
that Robert Kagan describes as distinctive of the “American way of law”57  
(to be contrasted with the greater reliance on bureaucratic means of policy 
making and implementation found in Europe) that law is in practice less a 
salient part of everyday life in the U.S. than elsewhere? 
In this section, I review some indicators—incomplete at best—of the 
overall extent to which the U.S. devotes resources at a macro level to the 
delivery of legality, both in absolute terms and in comparison to other 
countries.  By focusing on the macro perspective, I hope to move the em-
phasis away from the provision of legal support to the poor in ex post crisis 
 
 56. See generally U.N. COMM’N ON THE LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, MAKING 
THE LAW WORK FOR EVERYONE (2008), available at http://www.undp.org/legal 
empowerment/report/Making_the_Law_Work_for_Everyone.pdf. 
 57. ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3-6 (2001). 
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and towards the systemic everyday use of law in fact by ordinary citizens 
throughout the income spectrum. 
In 2005, legal services provided by private practitioners generated 
$180.9 billion58 in gross domestic product in the United States; total re-
ceipts for law firms totaled $221.6 billion.59  Neither figure counts legal 
services provided within corporations, government, legal aid providers, or 
other private associations, which account for 18% of all lawyers.60  If we 
“gross up” these numbers to value the contributions of lawyers in these 
other settings, the total size of the legal services sector in the United States 
is thus roughly $226 billion in GDP terms and $277 billion in expenditures 
on legal services.61 
Of the roughly $277 billion spent on legal services, approximately 31% 
is consumed by individuals as part of personal consumption expenditures 
($85.6 billion in 2005).62  Another 1% ($2.8 billion) can be attributed to 
services provided by legal aid lawyers and public defenders.63  Some share, 
but it is not possible to easily say how much of the expenditure on govern-
ment lawyers other than legal aid and public defenders may be attributable 
to providing services to individual Americans; in some sense, one could 
classify all of those expenditures (approximately $22 billion or 8%) as be-
ing on behalf of ordinary citizens.  This suggests that at most 40% of legal 
services are serving the needs of individual citizens as opposed to corpora-
tions and businesses. 
These figures comport with data from the only U.S. study addressing the 
allocation of legal effort across different types of matters and clients.  The 
Chicago Lawyers’ Survey, first conducted in 1975 and updated in 1995, es-
timated that Chicago lawyers devoted 29% of total effort to services for in-
dividual or small business clients with an additional 6% serving organiza-
tions such as unions, environmental plaintiffs, state administrative agencies 
 
 58. U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS tbl.648 (2007), 
available at http://bea.gov/scb/pdf/2007/01%20January/D-Pages/0107dpg_e.pdf. 
 59. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SERVICE ANNUAL SURVEY 2005, CURRENT BUSINESS REPORTS 
tbl.6.1 (2007), available at http://www2.census.gov/services/sas/data/Historical/sas-05.pdf. 
 60. AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 2004 6 (2000 data).  Seventy-
four percent work in private practice, 5% are inactive or retired, 3% serve in the judiciary, 
and 1% in legal academia. 
 61. By way of comparison, in 2005, GDP in educational services was $116 billion; 
health care services $860 billion; agriculture $123 billion; food, beverage, and tobacco 
products $176 billion; securities and investment services $168 billion; and computer servic-
es $141 billion. U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS tbl.648 
(Apr. 2007). 
 62. Id. at tbl.655. 
 63. This is an (overestimate) based on the fact that 1% of lawyers work as legal aid law-
yers or public defenders. AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 60, at 28. 
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or municipalities for a total of 35%; this is a decrease from 45% in 1975.64  
These figures probably understate the total share of all legal services state-
wide and nationwide because of the concentration of corporate law firms in 
this major financial center.65  Correcting for this problem by looking prov-
ince-wide in Ontario, Ronit Dinovitzer and I estimated that in 1998 Ontario 
lawyers devoted 42% of their effort to services for individual as opposed to 
corporate clients; in Toronto, a city of comparable size and financial signi-
ficance as Chicago, the figure was 31%.66  These numbers are in line with 
the census-based estimate referenced above, indicating that less than 40% 
of all legal services in the U.S. are available to ordinary citizens, including 
those (approximately 8%) wielded on behalf of ordinary citizens by gov-
ernments.67 
In the abstract and in isolation it is difficult to say whether this share of 
legal services devoted to ordinary citizens’ interests is enough.  Of course, 
the ordinary citizen benefits from the operation of well-regulated and effi-
cient markets and thus from the availability of legal services to corporate 
entities as well.  To put further perspective on these numbers, I have there-
fore calculated what the personal share of the legal services market 
represents in terms of available legal effort and how this has changed over 
the last few decades. 
In 1990, total expenditures by households on legal services were $62.2 
billion in 2000 dollars.68  At that time, the average hourly rate for lawyers 
in small firms (less than 20 lawyers, where we find most of the lawyers 
providing services to individuals) was roughly (very roughly!) $157 in 
2000 dollars.69  Based on the total U.S. population for that year, this im-
plies an average of 1.6 hours per person for the year or 4.15 hours per aver-
 
 64. John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers’ Work: Chicago in 1975 
and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 752, 765 (1998). 
 65. See id. at 757-58. 
 66. Unpublished data on file with author.  We also estimated that an additional 10% 
worked in government, thus suggesting that a total of close to 55% of legal work is on be-
half of ordinary citizens. 
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63. 
 68. U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS tbl.655 (Apr. 
2007). 
 69. This figure is based on Altman-Weil data, which is a self-selected proprietary survey 
and subject to substantial error.  It is, however, the only quasi-systematic data I am aware of 
for hourly rates nationally in this year.  I took a straight (unweighted) average of rates for 
those with 4-5 years experience and those with 11-20 years experience for firms with less 
than 9 and 9-20 lawyers and inflated based on the CPI. See ALTMAN-WEIL, supra note 1, at 
81-134. 
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age household.70  Conducting the same calculation for 2005 (total expendi-
tures of $67.4 billion in 2000 dollars, an average hourly rate of $182 for 
small-firm lawyers71) yields an average of 1.3 hours per person or 3.34 
hours per household, a decline of 20%.  As a rough calculation, using the 
ABA 1994 Legal Needs estimates of numbers of problems per household in 
a given year (1.0)72 and a straight average of the number of problems per 
household reported by the state surveys (2.0)73 for 2005 this suggests that 
in 1990 American households were able on average to draw on approx-
imately 4 hours of legal time to address a legal problem and in 2005 they 
were able to draw on 1 hour and 40 minutes of legal time to address a prob-
lem. 
These are startlingly low numbers, and they reflect only the corner of the 
legal landscape that involves a crisis such as a dispute over employment, a 
foreclosure, a denial of health care, or the risk of injury to or a diminished 
relationship with a child.  They exclude the demand for legal assistance be-
fore problems arise, such as legal advice in assessing a complex mortgage 
offer, employment options, insurance coverage, or the potential for conduct 
to influence custody of a child.  Suppose that for every dispute-related need 
there is an ex ante advice-related need (as appears to be the case for large 
corporations),74 meaning that there are twice as many legal needs as those 
measured by studies asking only about dispute-related needs.  This would 
then imply that the average household is able to draw on less than an hour’s 
worth of legal advice or assistance in dealing with the points at which their 
everyday lives intersect with the legal system. 
How does this compare with the availability of legal resources for those 
who live in ostensibly less law-thick environments around the globe?  I do 
not have comparable data on personal expenditures on legal services and 
average hourly rates in other countries with which to do similar calcula-
 
 70. U.S. CENSUS, HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE AND SIZE: 1900-2002, available at http://www. 
census.gov/statab/hist/HS-12.pdf (using an estimated average household size of 2.6 people). 
 71. This figure is based on Altman-Weil data for 2005, taking a straight average of rates 
for equity partners and associates in firms of less than 9 and 9-20 lawyers ($206) and deflat-
ing by the CPI.  ALTMAN-WEIL, supra note 1, at 104. 
 72. These surveys are of problems facing poor households, but the ABA Legal Needs 
Survey suggests that the rate for poor households is not significantly different from that for 
moderate-income households. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at *9. 
 73. I have excluded the data for New Jersey from this calculation because it is based on 
problems per individual. See supra tbl.2. 
 74. Mark Chandler, General Counsel of Cisco Systems Inc., reports that total legal ex-
penditures in his company are .3% of company revenue with .16% coming from nonlitiga-
tion expenses. Leslie A. Gordon, Meet an In-House Cost Cutter Who Believes in Fixed Fees, 
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Aug. 29, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id= 
1188291741577. 
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tions.  But we do have recently released comparative data on expenditures 
in the legal system as a whole for a large set of European countries75 and it 
is to these data that I turn for (again, rough) estimates of the availability of 
legal resources in the economy as a whole for ordinary citizens to address 
their relationships with and through the legal system.76 
Table 3 provides data for the U.S. and a selection of European countries 
showing the following: total population; total public expenditure on courts, 
public prosecution and legal aid; total numbers of criminal and civil cases; 
and total numbers of judges and lawyers.  These data should be read care-
fully, keeping in mind the potential for differences in the categories of what 
is counted and how data requests in the European survey were inter-
preted.77  United States criminal cases include serious crimes and misde-
meanors but exclude the fifty-five million traffic cases that also appear in 
state courts; the European data cover both serious crimes and misdemea-
nors but purport to exclude administrative offenses and those processed by 
the police such as minor traffic offenses.  Civil cases include all non-
criminal filings in the U.S. state and federal courts but exclude filings be-
fore administrative agencies that are not appealed to a court. 
 
 75. EUROPEAN COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS: 
EDITION 2008 (DATA 2006):  EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY OF JUSTICE ch. 2.  In all data reported 
below euros are converted to U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of $1 = €0.74. 
 76. Justice Earl Johnson, Jr. first drew attention to just how low the U.S. expenditure on 
civil legal aid was relative to other advanced market democracies. Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal 
Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Industrial 
Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 83, 93-94 (2000). 
 77. It is particularly important to note that the data reported here differ substantially 
from data reported in Christian Wollschlager’s Exploring Global Landscapes of Litigation 
Rates, in SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERHARD BLANKENBURG 582 (Jurgen 
Brand & Dieter Strempel eds., 1998).  Wollschlager reports many more cases per capita for 
Germany than the data here; this is because Wollschlager includes summary debt collections 
that are excluded here.  Although Germany has by far the highest number of cases per capita 
in his data, and the U.S. ranks fifth, just ahead of the U.K. and Hungary, he notes that if the 
summary debt cases are excluded, the U.S. is the highest per capita after Israel. Id.  See also 
Blankenburg, The Infrastructure for Avoiding Civil Litigation: Comparing Cultures of Legal 
Behavior in the Netherlands and West Germany, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 789 (1994) (sug-
gesting that the Netherlands has a much lower, and Germany a much higher, number of cas-
es than is reported here).  I was unable to determine from the published studies what might 
account for these differences; one possibility is change over time.  Blankenburg appears to 
be drawing on data from the 1980s. 
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Table 3. Total Resources And Cases 
Country Population 
Public Ex-
penditure 
on Courts, 
Prosecutors 
& Legal 
Aid ($B) 
Legal 
Aid  
($M) 
Crim-
inal 
Cases 
(M) 
Civil 
Cases 
(M) Judges Lawyers 
U.S. 300,000,000 47.0 3,857* 20.8 24 30,000 1,162,124 
France 63,195,000 4.59 409 1.1 1.7 7,532 47,765 
Germany 82,351,000 11.76 753 1.2 1.1 20,138 138,104 
Hungary 10,006,600 0.54 0.27 0.3 0.2 2,838 9,850 
Nether-
lands 16,334,210 2.16 466 0.4 1 2,072 14,955 
Poland 38,125,479 2.03 30 2.1 1 9,853 25,972 
U.K. 
(England 
& 
Wales) 53,728,000 7.16 4,081 1.1 2.1 3,774 143,381 
Sources: European Judicial Systems (2008, 2006 data); U.S. Census Bureau; National Cen-
ter for State Courts 2005 State Court Statistics; Federal Judicial Center Annual Report of the 
Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts (2007); American Bar Foundation 
Lawyer Demographics (2008); Bureau of Justice Statistics: National Survey of Indigent De-
fense Systems (1999) (scaled up using population share from data for 100 most populous 
counties); Bureau of Justice Statistics: Annual Government Finance Survey (2005); Alan W. 
Houseman “The Future of Civil Legal Aid: A National Perspective” 10 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 
35 (2007) (estimate includes public and private charitable sources). 
* Includes private charitable expenditure on civil legal aid. 
 
The European case counts include litigious and non-litigious cases but 
exclude enforcement, land, and business registry cases and, for those coun-
tries with separate administrative law courts, administrative law cases.  The 
count of judges for the U.S. includes all full-time federal and state judicial 
officers including magistrates, but does not include judicial officers sitting 
pro tem (temporary judges) or administrative law judges in state or federal 
governments.  The European data includes full-time professional judges 
and excludes part-time professional judges and lay-judges.  The count of 
lawyers includes both advocates and legal advisors who are members of a 
bar.  This is a particularly difficult number to compare.  While the count of 
lawyers who belong to a bar association in the U.S. is a very good measure 
of the availability of legal advice and representation—as only these people 
can provide these services—in most other countries bar membership is not 
co-extensive with an authorization to provide services.  In the U.K., for ex-
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ample, anyone may provide legal advice, although only bar members (bar-
risters and solicitors) are counted here.  In many European countries law-
yers who are employed by a company, government, or organization need 
not—and in some cases may not—be a member of the bar and thus are not 
counted.  In addition, in several of these settings also, while representation 
in courts is restricted to bar members, legal advice may not be.  With these 
caveats in mind, Table 4 calculates the availability of legal resources per 
person and per case in the system. 
 
Table 4. Comparative Resources Per Person And Per Case78 
Country 
Public 
Expendi-
ture Per 
Capita 
Public 
Expendi-
ture Per 
Case 
Legal 
Aid  
Per 
Capita 
Legal 
Aid 
Per 
Case 
Judges 
Per 
100,000 
Persons 
Judges 
Per 
100,000 
Cases 
Lawyers 
Per 
100,000 
Persons 
Lawyers 
Per 
100,000 
Cases 
U.S. $157 $1,049 $13 $86 10 67 387 2594 
France $73 $1,665 $6 $148 12 273 76 1731 
Germany $143 $5,031 $9 $322 24 862 168 5909 
Hungary $54 $1,048 $0 $0 28 550 98 1909 
Nether-
lands $132 $1,507 $29 $325 13 144 92 1042 
Poland $53 $645 $0 $9 26 313 68 826 
U.K. 
(England 
& Wales) $133 $2,270 $76 $1,294 7 120 267 4545 
 
Table 4 suggests a stark picture of how few resources the U.S. economy 
as a whole may devote to delivering to the legal system.  U.S. public ex-
penditure per capita on courts, judges, prosecutors, and legal aid is the 
highest among this set of both advanced and transitioning European coun-
tries.  U.S. public expenditure per case, however, is significantly lower than 
in other advanced democracies, when accounting for the apparently vastly 
higher numbers of cases in those countries (less than half compared to the 
U.K. and barely one-fifth of the expenditure in Germany) and comparable 
or higher than that spent in emerging market democracies that are still 
seeking to build the rule of law in their countries.  American legal aid per 
capita is lower than in the Netherlands and the U.K. and higher than in oth-
er advanced and emerging democracies; but legal aid per case is well below 
that expended in other advanced democracies, exceeding only the low le-
 
 78. All calculations were conducted from data noted in Table 3. 
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vels available in Hungary and Poland.  Legally-trained personnel also ap-
pear much less available in the U.S. when we take into account the number 
of cases in the U.S.  The number of American judges per capita is signifi-
cantly lower than in Germany, Poland, and Hungary, comparable to the le-
vels in France and the Netherlands and higher than in the U.K. 
But again the intensity of legal demand in the U.S., as measured by 
number of cases, reveals that per case there are far fewer judges available 
than in any of these European countries: half as many as in the U.K. and 
the Netherlands, roughly a quarter of those available in France and less 
than one-tenth of those in Germany and Hungary.  Lawyers do not clearly 
make up the difference: while there are more lawyers per capita in the U.S. 
than in this set of comparison countries, again the numbers per case reveal 
that Germany and the U.K., with more than twice the number of judges per 
case, also have more than twice as many lawyers per case.  In Table 4, the 
U.S numbers per case appear to be higher than in France, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, and Poland—but recall that in those countries bar members do 
not have the complete monopoly on provision of legal services that they do 
in the U.S. and so the European numbers are (perhaps significantly) unders-
tated.  Moreover, given that the ultimate goal is making legal services 
available to individuals as opposed to business, the relatively large corpo-
rate sector in the U.S. also suggests that the U.S. figure is an overstatement. 
Not all the lawyers in these counts, of course, are delivering litigation-
related services such as those that would be demanded by individuals (and 
businesses—the data here do not separate out client types) in court cases.  
But we can interpret the number of cases in the courts as an indicator of the 
level of overall demand in the economy for legal inputs in the planning and 
management of social and economic relationships.  There is no clear or 
singular interpretation of the substantially higher number of cases per capi-
ta in the U.S.: this could be because of more law, greater willingness to use 
courts as opposed to alternative means for dispute resolution, and/or higher 
levels of unmet needs for ex ante legal advice, planning and dispute resolu-
tion assistance.  But this is precisely what makes the strikingly low levels 
of legal resources so salient: U.S. socio-economic life is, as Robert Kagan 
has emphasized, substantially more reliant on law and legal management of 
relationships,79 and yet the U.S. devotes far fewer resources to providing 
the legal services needed to translate law on the books into law on the 
ground. 
The data in Table 4 thus reinforce what we learned from a comparative 
look at the legal needs surveys.  Interestingly, although poor Americans do 
 
 79. See KAGAN, supra note 57, at 51-54. 
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not report significantly higher rates of legal problems than average income 
citizens in other countries, they do report much lower use of legal assis-
tance in resolving their problems—and much higher rates of simply giving 
up and assuming nothing can be done.  Table 4 suggests the macro context 
in which these differences emerge.  Americans face a legal world that is 
thick with legal structure but thin on legal resources. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented above is suggestive only.  This is not a careful 
study that controls for the nature of legal problems, the opportunity for 
problems to be resolved in less litigious ways, and the resources necessary 
to achieve that goal.  The thinness of the available data simply does not al-
low for such careful comparison, although the existing data clearly suggest 
the need for such a study to be conducted.80  The results, however, as rough 
and ready as they are, nonetheless present a serious challenge to the Ameri-
can courts which have, for the last 100 years, claimed exclusive authority 
to regulate the entire legal system in the U.S. 81  The profession’s assertion 
of regulatory authority has arguably blocked the capacity for federal or 
state regulatory or policy responses to the crises in U.S. legal systems. 
What accounts for the significantly lower level of legal resources—
public expenditure, legal aid, judges, and (for Germany and the U.K.) law-
yers—available at the macro level in the U.S. as compared to other ad-
vanced market democracies?  For the roughly 60% decline over the past 
fifteen years in the total effective number of hours of legal services per 
household per problem?  For the apparent 50% drop in the use of legal ser-
vices by the poor in addressing their problems in the decade since the 1995 
A.B.A. study?  The lack of systematic data makes causal analysis difficult 
and speculative.  Clearly we need substantially more attention to detailed 
study of the nature of legal systems and how they shape and meet the de-
mand for legal services.  In this concluding section I offer some prelimi-
nary thoughts on how those studies should be framed. 
 
 80. Herbert M. Kritzer, To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer: Is that the Question?, 5 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 875, 885 (2008) (examining the relationship between income and the de-
cision to use a lawyer across several countries).  Kritzer’s findings are supported also by the 
numbers I report here, namely that the likelihood of using a lawyer is roughly the same 
across different countries (with the exception of Japan), although the rates of using non-
lawyer (but potentially still “legal”) resources and “doing something” seems significantly 
higher elsewhere. 
 81. See Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the Practice of 
Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 525 (1983); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal 
Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control Over Corpo-
rate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1696-1701 (2008). 
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The access problems in the U.S. legal system are largely conceptualized 
by the profession as problems of the ethical commitments of individual 
lawyers to assist the poor and the failure of federal and state bodies to pro-
vide adequate levels of funding to legal aid agencies and the courts.  The 
first conceptualization fails, I believe, to come to grips with the dimensions 
of the problem, which cannot be solved with an increase in pro bono ef-
forts, as welcome as such an increase would be.  Pro bono currently ac-
counts for at most 1-2% of legal effort in the country; even if every lawyer 
in the country did 100 more hours a year of pro bono work, this would 
amount to an extra thirty minutes per U.S. person a year, or about an hour 
per dispute-related (potentially litigation-related) problem per household.  
This does not even begin to address the realistic demands that ordinary 
households have for ex ante assistance with navigating the law-thick world 
in which they live, some of which could indeed reduce the need for ex post 
legal representation in litigation and crisis.  The problem is not a problem 
of the ethical commitment of lawyers to help the poor.  Nor is an increase 
in public legal aid likely to make a substantial impact.  The cost of even 
that extra hour per dispute-related problem per household would be on the 
order of $20 billion annually at a market rate of $200 per hour.82  That 
would entail a twenty-fold increase in current U.S. levels of public and pri-
vate (charitable) legal aid funding.  Again, more legal aid funding would be 
welcome and is clearly called for, but it cannot make a serious dent in the 
nature of the problem. 
So what is the problem?  The bits of data we can see in the comparative 
analyses are suggestive of an important role for the regulatory and policy-
making structure governing legal markets in the U.S.  The U.S. stands 
largely alone in the world in terms of the extraordinary extent to which the 
bar and judiciary wield exclusive authority for shaping the cost and market 
structure of legal goods and services.  Some of this difference can be seen 
to come from the structure of the courts and legal profession as elements of 
the civil service bureaucracy in countries such as Germany and France; this 
locates policy and funding decisions squarely within a government agency.  
In addition, civil law systems emphasize a much broader role for the judge, 
as opposed to parties and their lawyers, in the conduct of litigation.  This 
arguably accounts for the substantially higher allocation of resources to the 
court systems in Germany, with many more judges per case; it may also 
account for the higher number of lawyers “per case” given that legal fees in 
 
 82. This is slightly above the average I calculated from Altman-Weil data for lawyers 
working in solo or small firm (fewer than 20 lawyers) practice in 2005. See supra note 69 
and accompanying text. 
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Germany are frequently governed by statute in cases involving ordinary in-
dividuals. 
But the U.K. is a powerful counterexample to the hypothesis that we are 
seeing a difference between common law and civil code systems.  The U.K. 
clearly devotes substantially more resources to the provision of legal ser-
vices to ordinary citizens, measured in terms of public expenditure, legal 
aid or judges per “case,” even though the U.K. follows the common law 
practice of much greater reliance on the adversarial resources of parties to 
structure litigation.  What explains this?  Again, I believe it has to do with 
the central role for governments in overseeing and regulating the legal sys-
tem.  Although the U.K. does not have a civil service judiciary as in civil 
code regimes, it has until very recently had central responsibility located in 
a single office, that of the Lord Chancellor who historically has been simul-
taneously the chief justice of the highest court (the House of Lords), a cab-
inet minister, and a member of Parliament.  This merger of functions (re-
cently disaggregated to separate out the judicial functions of chief justice 
from the executive and parliamentary functions of a minister of justice) 
created a single policy head capable of making decisions about civil proce-
dure, the staffing and funding of courts, and the regulation of legal services 
providers.  The longstanding commitment to robust legal aid arguably has 
sharpened the quality of policymaking in this integrated setting: because 
the government, ultimately led in this regard by someone who is both a 
judge and a politically accountable member of Parliament, pays the bills for 
legal aid, it has been both motivated to and capable of ensuring that ordi-
nary citizens have wide access to a variety of sources of legal advice and 
assistance.  And indeed the U.K., especially after significant reforms in 
2007, has probably the most open access legal system in the world.  A wide 
variety of non-lawyers can provide legal advice and some representational 
services; these can be offered through corporate entities with either private 
equity investment or publicly-traded shares and non-lawyer owners and 
managers.  There are multiple legal professions with separate regulatory 
bodies, all of which are accountable to a super-regulatory body which must 
be composed of a majority of non-lawyers, which is appointed by the Mi-
nister of Justice (formerly Lord Chancellor). 
When the data from the Netherlands, which has a comparably open sys-
tem allowing many non-lawyer service providers, is viewed alongside that 
of the U.K., the importance of empirically investigating the hypothesis that 
the regulatory system accounts for the failure of the U.S. legal system to 
provide an adequate level of legal inputs for ordinary people becomes even 
more apparent.  The striking difference in the rate at which people do noth-
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ing in response to legal difficulties between the U.S. (29% or higher)83 and 
the U.K. (3-5%) and the Netherlands (10%) is highly suggestive of the role 
that a robust system of legal inputs plays in making a legal system a real, 
rather than apparent, basis on which everyday lives are structured.  A care-
ful study of how different regulatory regimes influence not only the use of 
legal resources in resolving problems once they have erupted but also the 
use of these resources ex ante to decide what transactions and relationships 
to enter into, leave, modify, and so on is clearly called for by these results. 
Those concerned with access to justice have long emphasized how the 
extreme approach to unauthorized practice of law in the United States dras-
tically curtails the potential for ordinary folks to obtain assistance with their 
law-related needs and problems.  Key contributions have been made in this 
regard by Deborah Rhode,84 David Luban,85 and Barlow Christensen.86  
American lawyers often take for granted that it is natural that anyone who 
wishes to practice law must be an authorized member of a bar association 
and subject to the admissions, ethical, and disciplinary controls of the pro-
fession, including the judiciary.  The regulatory problem, however, goes 
beyond a straightforward restriction on supply.  The more fundamental 
problem with the existing regulatory structure is traceable to the fact that 
the American legal profession is a politically unaccountable regulator, 
which lacks the funding levers and policymaking apparatus needed for a 
sector that is a huge share of the American economy and one that plays an 
increasingly important role in a rapidly changing and decentralized eco-
nomic system.  Many critics of the bar’s self-regulation have decried the 
tendency for the bar to put professional self-interest ahead of public inter-
est.87  But this is what one would predict given that the bar is not a politi-
 
 83. Twenty-nine percent is the figure from the ABA study. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 
3, at *17-18 (weighted average); the state legal needs surveys report rates ranging from 21% 
to 53%.  See supra tbl.2. 
 84. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); DEBORAH L. RHODE, 
IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); Deborah L. 
Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of 
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981); Deborah L. Rhode, Profes-
sionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to NonLawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 701 (1996). 
 85. See generally DAVID LUBAN,  LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988). 
 86. See generally Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good 
Fences Really Make Good Neighbors—or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
159 (1980). 
 87. See, e.g., ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 378 (1993); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 
59 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1981); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regu-
lation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 
GA. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2003); Benjamin H. Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An 
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cally accountable policymaker.  Even if the bar’s narrow focus on ethical 
duties that govern attorney-client relationships were, as it likely often is, a 
well-intentioned execution of the norms that are absorbed through the 
process of legal training, rather than craven self-interest, the fact remains 
that like any body it responds to its constituencies.  The bar has by and 
large steered utterly clear of the idea that it is responsible—politically re-
sponsible—for the system-wide cost and complexity of the legal system, 
far beyond the ethical call to help the poor and perform pro bono work.  It 
requires a political process to shift perceptions—much as perceptions about 
the federal government’s responsibility for high gas prices or stock market 
failures are molded not in the abstract but in the crucible of political contest 
and public debate.  The public does not hear policy positions from the poli-
cymaker—the bar—and does not vote or otherwise express its views on 
how the policymaker is executing on policy. 
Because the bar, together with the state judiciaries, asserts exclusive pol-
icy authority in this field but is not in fact a politically accountable policy-
making body, there is effectively no mechanism for policy change.  There 
is nowhere to address policy proposals and no process for influencing poli-
cy adoption.  The process is a wholly closed shop; indeed, legal researchers 
who like myself are not members of any bar have nowhere to address poli-
cy recommendations and no avenues through which to put substantive poli-
cy options on the agenda.  That this does not seem an extraordinary way for 
an advanced market democracy to make economic and social policy is it-
self a consequence of the framing that results from the bar’s assertion of 
authority.  The bar bases its role on its expertise in the attorney-client rela-
tionship—and it styles its regulatory functions as the promulgation and en-
forcement of ethical standards.  There are indeed ethical demands on law-
yers and their professional bodies.  But this defines out of the frame the 
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fundamentally economic character of the market regulation the bar and ju-
diciary control.  The problem of access to justice, however, needs to be 
seen not as an ethical problem but as a market regulatory problem.  Law-
yers do not possess the expertise, the accountability, the tax-and-spend au-
thority, or the policy making apparatus necessary to design and implement 
economic policy. 
The problem we face in the American legal system is not a problem of 
how to increase pro bono or legal aid (although we should do that too), 
which are ultimately mere drops in the bucket on the order of a few percen-
tage points of total legal effort and resources.  Rather, the problem is one of 
urgent need for structural reform in the regulatory and policy/funding sys-
tem responsible for the critical infrastructure of market democracy, particu-
larly one that draws as heavily as the American system does on law and le-
galism to structure economic, political, and social relationships. 
